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Introduction 
 
The United Nations is one of the world’s significant employers, with a multinational 
workforce stretching across all continents. Its ever-changing needs and the plethora of 
urgent and long-term circumstances it is mandated to address require constant 
recruitment at both junior and senior levels. The task of recruitment and promotions 
within the Organization is entrusted to and exercised by the Secretariat and as will 
become evident in the course of this article, the Secretary-General has been invested with 
a seminal exclusive authority, which he can unilaterally exercise in respect of senior 
appointments. This authority is complementary to the institutional employment law of the 
United Nations, which is circumscribed by its Charter, relevant General Assembly 
resolutions and the Secretariat’s own Staff Rules and Regulations. The Secretariat has 
during the last two decades made a concerted effort to enhance the position of its female 
workforce through a system of quotas and policies aimed at securing a 50/50 equilibrium 
between men and women, both in terms of appointments and promotions. 
 
This article seeks to discuss these developments in light of the UN’s institutional 
employment law, but more importantly assess why these normative initiatives have failed 
to increase the presence of women at the senior levels of the Organization.
1
 We examine 
in particular the practice of States with regard to their nominations for senior posts in 
international organizations and determine whether the lack of open and fair competitions 
constitutes an impediment to the nomination of female candidates. Practice suggests that 
when it comes to nominations for international posts, States somehow feel free to 
disregard their laws relating to appointments to equivalent domestic posts, where indeed 
such laws exist, particularly in the field of judicial appointments.
2
 When such 
nominations are received by the Secretariat a powerful interplay of politics
3
 and 
interpersonal relations further distorts the human resources orientation of the UN. To a 
very large degree we find these policies to have failed female appointments in the most 
senior echelons of the Organization, particularly women from the developing world, far 
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more than their developed world counterparts For obvious reasons, one should 
necessarily take into consideration the exigencies of UN field operations, which in all 
likelihood fail to give rise to positive discrimination obligations to accommodate gender 
particularities. Given that the UN’s institutional culture plays a very significant part in 
this failure, we propose a radical reappraisal of the Organization’s employment policies 
and rules with a view to achieving its stated goal of gender parity. 
 
 
 
The Law Applicable to UN Employment Relations 
 
The employment relations of international organizations are principally governed by their 
founding constitutional treaty, as well as their Headquarters Agreement with the host 
State.
4
 In reality, HQ agreements do not aspire to govern the organisation’s employment 
relations, but only its legal status on the territory of the host State. However, there is no 
rule of international law that limits the parties in discussing employment matters in the 
their respective HQ agreement.
5
  In the vast majority of cases the regulation of the 
organisation’s institutional employment relations in the HQ agreement will be through a 
negative inference, if any. The constitutive treaty will most commonly provide general 
guidelines and principles, but will not elaborate much on the modalities of employment 
and the status of personnel, nor will it dictate matters relating to salaries, promotions, 
secondments, appointments, resolution of grievances, etc. These matters are too specific 
to be considered in a founding treaty and it is usually the Secretariat or the Assembly that 
puts in place the appropriate mechanisms, drafts staff rules and regulations, establishes 
administrative tribunals, hires personnel and generally caters for all matters relating to 
employment relations and human resources management. Equally, the various organs of 
the international organization, each within its designated sphere of competence, may well 
adopt a resolution that is only binding within the confines of the organization, by which it 
aims to resolve or clarify an employment issue.
6
 There is thus a layered hierarchy within 
international organizations that definitively governs both its substantive as well as its 
procedural employment law and which is binding internally for each member of the 
organization and the legal person of the organization itself.
7
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organizations that governed their employment relations and not the law of the host State, 
or the law of the State of the employee’s nationality.8 This is by no means an inherent 
element in the sphere of competence of international organizations, but is instead the 
result of serious policy considerations; for if the organization was to be an independent 
legal person from the person of its member States, and its employees free from the 
influence of any State, and moreover free to undertake their functions without being 
constrained by the law of the host State, which includes not having to settle their 
employment disputes in local courts, the organization would need to be able to dispose 
independently of its employment relations.
9
 On the other hand, one could plausibly argue 
that it would certainly save an organization such as the UN significant administrative and 
financial resources had it decided to insert a clause in its contracts of employment 
empowering the courts of New York, or other local courts, to settle all disputes in 
accordance with the labor law of New York and subject to its Staff Rules and Regulations  
and the UN Charter. In this manner there would be no need to remove the employees’ tax 
exemptions, privileges and immunities, save so far as this was specifically warranted by 
New York’s employment legislation. The choice not to submit to this arrangement is 
certainly a calculated one. For one thing, a significant element pertaining to the 
organization’s powers would be removed from its ambit and ceded to the un-checked and 
un-controllable power of local courts, which may potentially render litigation expenses 
very costly. Moreover, in a super-litigious jurisdiction such as the USA the 
unpredictability of the amounts of compensatory judgments is far too big a risk to 
undertake. Thus, ceding jurisdiction to local courts has the potential of undermining the 
organization by eroding its assets. Secondly, the submission to local laws and courts 
serves only to undermine the immunities and privileges of the organization and of its 
personnel because the applicable law would no longer be international, but domestic law, 
at least as far as the sphere of employment relations is concerned.
10
 Given the founding 
treaty’s broad language, there would in actual fact be no international law to challenge or 
override local law as a practical matter of lex specialis. Finally, if employment relations 
were governed by the laws of the host State, then the organization would be unable to 
hire the personnel it desired, or assign to them required functions, particularly where said 
persons and functions were contrary to the laws or policies of the host State. In a string of 
early UNAT cases, the Secretary-General had proceeded to terminate temporary-
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indefinite contracts without renewing them as fixed term contracts and without giving 
any reasons or adequate notice to the plaintiffs. UNAT affirmed that the power of the 
Secretary-General to terminate these contracts in such a manner was limited by the UN 
Charter, General Assembly resolutions, the UN’s Staff Rules and Regulations and other 
institutional instruments.
11
 Amerasinghe asserts that the employees in question were 
nationals of the host State and that the Secretary-General terminated their contracts 
because they failed to act in conformity with US law.
12
 
 
The Staff Rules and Regulations,
13
 therefore, of the United Nations are of the utmost 
importance in regulating employment matters. They and the UN Charter, however, are 
not the only applicable source of law. We have already referred to the binding nature of 
UNAT judgments (although the Secretary-General may ultimately decide in theory not to 
follow them), but the same is true in respect of the contractual undertakings between the 
UN and its employees.
14
 Given that unlike other international organizations where 
employment relations are governed by statutory provisions,
15
 in the UN these are 
governed also by the specific terms of the contract of employment.
16
 The terms of the 
contract, however, do not override the statutory provisions in the UN’s institutional law 
that relate to employment, but are instead subject to its terms and conditions. The UNAT 
in the Kaplan case made it clear that: 
 
… relations between staff members and the UN involve various elements and are not solely contractual in 
nature… In determining the legal position of staff members a distinction should be made between 
contractual elements and statutory elements: All matters being contractual which affect the personal status 
of each member – e.g. nature of his contract, salary, grade; all matters being statutory which affect in 
general the organization of the international civil service and the need for its proper functioning – e.g. 
general rules that have no personal reference.
17
 
 
Under UN Staff Regulation 4.1 the appointment of personnel is subject to the acceptance 
of a letter of appointment, a contractual undertaking, since it requires consideration on 
the part of the employee, but which is expressly subject to the organization’s Staff Rules 
and Regulations.
18
 The significance of this observation is that whereas the purely 
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contractual elements cannot be amended without the agreement of the two parties, the 
statutory elements may always be altered at any time unilaterally by the General 
Assembly and these changes are binding on all staff.
19
 
 
In deciphering the meaning of, and in giving effect to the UN’s Staff Rules and 
Regulations, the UNAT has incorporated as applicable law elements of international law; 
particularly general principles of law, such as equity and justice,
20
 estoppel,
21
 fairness
22
 
and others. It seems prudent to include within this plethora of sources also general 
international law, but any rules to this effect can only be applicable where they have been 
incorporated in the expressed internal law of the United Nations. Thus, not every 
international treaty or customary rule is binding on the employment relationship of the 
UN with its employees, but only those that have been expressly incorporated in the 
organization by resolution of a principal organ or a subsidiary body thereto.
23
 
 
A fundamental question arises as a result of our aforementioned observation that the 
regulation of all UN employment relations is governed by contract, subject to the 
institutional employment law of the United Nations. Can the UN decide to discriminate 
both in the recruitment process, as well as in respect of its applications for promotion in 
terms of sex, if by doing so it would not be in violation of the UN Charter, despite 
violating other human rights treaties and the laws of a great number of States? A response 
to this question will be provided in the next section. 
 
 
 
The United Nations’ Authority to Discriminate In the Context of its Institutional 
Employment Law 
 
Although the main focus of this article is on the UN’s policies with regard to the 
employment of women in its higher policy-making and judicial echelons, the policies of 
an organization at its senior levels is correlated to that at its lower levels. The primary 
legal basis for this discussion is Article 8 of the UN Charter, which states that: “the UN 
shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of women to participate in any capacity and 
under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs”. Given the significant 
workplace gender imbalances prevalent in the aftermath of the creation of the UN, the 
wording of Article 8 begs the question whether it is an objective that the Organization 
ought to pursue as a matter of mandate, or whether it is simply an undertaking of fairness 
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and even-handedness in the UN’s employment procedures. A textual reading certainly 
seems to point to the latter construction, but the dynamic interpretation of Article 8, 
coupled with progressive legislation worldwide addressing gender disparity in 
employment matters, has radically altered the UN’s institutional viewpoint on its 
obligations arising from  this provision. 
 
Although UNAT has had a chance to address sex discrimination in the late 1970s,
24
 it 
was not until the late 1980s that the Secretariat started to adopt a more proactive stance 
with respect to the Organization’s gender disparity all the way from its junior 
professional posts (P-1 and P-2) up until its senior D-1 and above positions. We shall not 
attempt here to narrate the entire history of all those measures, but it suffices to say that 
on 19 February 1987 the UN’s Appointments and Promotions Board issued a set of 
Guidelines that elaborated and set out a policy of affirmative action in respect of 
appointments and promotions for women. Among the measures taken in the Guidelines 
was a so-called “seniority calculation technique” which in the case of women candidates 
served to average their years in service with a view to increasing their chances of 
promotion. It was very significant that UNAT held that these affirmative action 
Guidelines did not constitute sex discrimination in favor of women because the technique 
could not be employed to promote females whose relative qualifications or merit were  
lower than male colleagues , thus affirming that the Guidelines did not breach Article 
101(3) of the UN Charter.
25
 Moreover, the Guidelines were found not to have breached 
Article 8 of the UN Charter.
26
 Since then a string of similar guidelines have been issued, 
particularly with respect to those departments in the UN system where gender parity is 
very low. Thus, in the Grinblat case, a similar set of affirmative action Guidelines were 
adopted by the Secretary-General
27
 and challenged by a male applicant on the basis that 
they required promotion of female candidates with equal qualifications solely on the basis 
of gender.
28
 The Appointments and Promotions Board had proceeded to interpret the 
Guidelines as requiring the disqualification of all men from the post in question. The 
UNAT held that while the imposition of corrective measures in addressing gender parity 
was legitimate and consistent with the relevant provisions of the UN Charter, the outright 
disqualification of men was not.
29
 
 
It is clear that these affirmative action policies of the UN, both by the Secretary-
General,
30
 as well as the General Assembly are not aimed at appointing or promoting 
women over men generally, but only under circumstances where the applicants for the 
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same job possess “substantially the same qualifications”,31 on the basis of the designated 
criteria of Article 101(3) of the UN Charter; i.e. efficiency, competence and integrity. 
Since the early 1990s the Assembly has set goals to address gender disparity in the 
Organization, starting with elevating the presence of women to 35 percent
32
 and then 
gradually setting itself a target of 50/50 with respect to gender distribution in posts 
subject to geographic representation.
33
 Equally, it has called for the admission or 
promotion of more women in the senior echelons,
34
 but this is the subject of attention in a 
following section. Moreover, it has set up advisory and monitoring bodies to advance 
gender equality in the United Nations, particularly through the appointment of a Steering 
Committee for the Improvement of the Status of Women in the Secretariat,
35
 as well as 
the establishment of the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and 
Advancement of Women (OSAGI).
36
 The UN is therefore no stranger to institutional 
positive discrimination in favour of women as a matter of policy. 
 
It may be prudent at this juncture to briefly assess the positive discrimination policies of 
other intergovernmental organizations and States in relation to gender. It will become 
obvious that despite the existence of a rudimentary trend, the rules in each system are 
essentially context-specific. Article 141(4) of the EC Treaty allows States to adopt 
positive action rules “in order to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a 
vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional 
careers”. In practice, litigation over the scope of positive action has been confined to 
Article 2(4) of the EC’s Equal Payment Directive,37 for which the ECJ has ruled out an 
effect that is tantamount to compulsory positive action.
38
 The ECJ has made it clear that 
positive action will always be an exception to formal equality and that for a measure to be 
accepted as one of positive action it must be premised on clear and umambiguous criteria, 
address specific career inequalities and help women to conduct their professional life on a 
more equal footing with men.
39
 This does not mean that positive action is not desirable; 
on the contrary, it is deemed an essential component of policy action as long as it 
complies with the principle of proportionality.
40
 In the context of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), its general provision on non-discrimination, 
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Article 14, has not given rise to significant litigation given that the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) views the provision as giving rise generally to formal equality. 
Nonetheless, the ECtHR has highlighted the position that different situations must be 
treated differently, thus endorsing positive action under such circumstances.
41
 The 
ECtHR was not, however, prepared to go as far as accommodating gypsy demands that 
their caravan sites be offered special treatment,
42
 apparently because of potential policy 
implications. On the other hand, the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee 
clearly favours not only positive discrimination policies as such,
43
 but moreover endorses 
compulsory positive action through Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).
44
 Not surprisingly, the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has had an easy task in fully 
endorsing positive action in respect of Article 4(1) of CEDAW, which obliges States 
parties to adopt so-called “temporary special measures” in order to establish de facto 
equality between men and women. Although these are not compulsory per se on member 
States, the CEDAW Committee has noted that temporary special measures must be 
adopted where they are necessary and appropriate to accelerate the achievement of 
overall equality.
45
 Discerning general principles is no easy matter and we have not even 
attempted to determine domestic policies, which differ among various subject matters 
within the same State (e.g. university admission and equality in employment). 
Nonetheless, it is clear that despite numerous limitations, positive discrimination is 
generally applicable in addressing gender imbalances in employment relations.
46
 
 
One issue that will be addressed in a following section is whether in fact the UN sustains 
or reinforces a system of institutional sex discrimination, not obviously by virtue of 
policy given its aforementioned efforts, but through other political processes and 
procedures. As a matter of obligation, however, and besides the dictates of its own 
institutional law, can the UN discriminate in the domain of its exclusive employment 
relations in contravention of general international law? For one thing, we determined that 
UN internal law overrides the law of the host State, with one notable exception, which 
has gone unnoticed. Section 19 of the UN-USA HQ Agreement stipulates that no racial 
or religious discrimination may be employed by the UN, a provision which presumably 
the UN is bound to observe also with respect to its employment relations. The provision 
is, however, silent on the issue of gender and is thus inapplicable in the present context. 
Secondly, we have equally established UNAT’s confirmation to the effect that general 
principles of law are binding on the Organization’s employment policies and contractual 
undertakings. Hence, a breach of said principles will incur the liability of the UN vis-à-
vis the injured party. The fundamental question is whether and to what degree the UN’s 
institutional law is superseded by the labor rights provisions incorporated in international 
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human rights treaties, particularly the ICCPR,
47
 the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
48
 as well as specialized ILO conventions.
49
 The 
simple answer is that since agreements are binding on the parties thereto, the UN can 
only incur treaty obligations from agreements to which it is a party. The ICCPR is not 
open to international organizations in any event.
50
 Moreover, the ICCPR cannot become 
binding on the UN by virtue of the fact that the vast majority of its member States are 
signatories, because of the UN’s distinct legal personality from that of its members. To 
leave it at that would no doubt make a mockery of the entire UN system, which was the 
principal force for a period of three decades behind the promulgation and final adoption 
of the ICCPR. Equally, to assume that the UN should interpret its institutional law in 
accordance with the ICCPR because the Secretary-General acts as depository and 
facilitates the Covenant’s judicial and other functions, is without legal merit. What stand 
to legal merit, however, are the affirmations in the preamble that the rights prescribed 
therein flow from, and are consistent, with human dignity and are moreover an 
elaboration of the more general principles found in the UN Charter itself. As a result, the 
Organization may validly employ the relevant provisions of the ICCPR in order to 
construe the UN Charter in respect of its employment relations. To the extent, 
nonetheless, that the relevant principles in the ICCPR do not constitute general principles 
of law, they do not bind the UN, but may validly – but only - be used as interpretative 
tools for deciphering the UN Charter.
51
 The same is true with respect to the ICESCR, but 
it is doubtful how many provisions in the ILO conventions can satisfy at all times the 
aforementioned criteria. 
 
One should also address to some degree the more general cultural issue that necessarily 
permeates this discussion; that is, why should the UN adhere to a culture of gender 
equality at a time when many of its members refuse to do so as a matter of their domestic 
policy? The answer to this question lies in the nature of the UN as a self-contained 
institutional system that is predicated on equality of employment and opportunities in its 
constitutional instrument, as well as in its later institutional policies. The UN’s 
institutional law is not based on the subtotal of the relevant domestic legal attitudes of its 
member States and as a result it is able to organize its internal affairs in ways that may 
turn out to be fundamentally opposed to the laws of some of its members. Thus, as a 
matter of policy, the UN has pursued an agenda of equal employment opportunities and 
gender mainstreaming both within the Organisation, but has also propagated it to its 
members through international gender conferences.
52
 This gender mainstreaming policy 
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has been translated and incorporated into the United Nations as a matter of internal law. 
In any event, to the best knowledge of this author, no UN member State has objected to 
the institutional gender policies of the Organisation; resistance is only visible to attempts 
to export such policies to member States. At another level, if one were to view the UN as 
an autonomous system that is independent from its external environment and its 
complexities, i.e. the legal systems of its member States, the UN would be able to code 
and interpret its external environment and its complexities through an internal selection 
process. As a result, the UN develops its own autopoietic internal processes that are by no 
means determined by factors external to this system.
53
 In this light, it is not paradoxical at 
all for the institutional law of the UN to be wholly antithetical to the law of some or many 
of its constituent members. 
 
Overall, therefore, the opinion of this author is that although the UN’s institutional law 
supersedes the law of the host State and the relevant provisions of international treaties to 
which the UN is not a party, the Organization may discriminate on the basis of sex, but 
only with a view to promoting gender parity, where this is lacking. Conversely, the UN 
may not discriminate other than through the implementation of affirmative action 
policies, as a matter of general principles of law and as a means of consistent 
interpretation of the human rights provisions contained in UN Charter and addressed to 
the Organization. As will become evident in following sections, one must necessarily 
adopt a realistic stance as to the Organisation’s factual capacity, particularly in the 
context of difficult field operations, to sustain gender policies. 
 
 
 
Female Access to Senior Positions in the UN System and the Exclusive Authority of 
the Secretary-General 
 
The UN’s Administrative Instruction (AI) on Special Measures for the Achievement of 
Gender Equality, promoted as a matter of institutional law, among others, the flexible 
interpretation of the principle of cumulative seniority in terms of female promotions, with 
a view to meeting its 50/50 targets.
54
 These and other measures highlighted above have 
not contributed toward gender parity, nor achieved any results in the realization of the 
50/50 target. A year after the promulgation of AI 412 by the Secretary General in 1996,
55
 
the Secretariat had a chance within the space of a year to assess the results of the 
measures contained in the AI. The Report noted that in 1997 a total of thirty-eight 
promotions were made, as compared with one hundred and ninety six in 1996. It 
emphasized in delight, however, that the percentage of promotions of women at D-1 level 
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and above had increased considerably.
56
 In his latest accessible report, the Secretary-
General pointed out that the representation of women in the professional and higher 
grades “remained almost static with negligible improvement and in some cases even a 
decrease”.57 In fact, appointments at the D-1 level stood at 25.3 percent, a decrease of 
6.95 percent.
58
 Equally, appointments to Under Secretary-General (USG) posts witnessed 
a decrease of 1.28 percent, but there was an increase of 4.01 percent and 2.88 percent at 
the D-2 and Assistant Secretary-General levels respectively.
59
 Overall, the percentage of 
appointments of women to professional and senior roles between 30 June 2004 to 30 June 
2006 rose by 0.06 percent.
60
 Given that the disparity at these senior positions at any given 
time averages, at best, at a ratio of about 30/70, marginal increases of this proportion are 
a drop in the UN’s ocean!  
 
The relevant UN reports provide a number of reasons as to why the level of female 
appointments at senior management level remains very low, such as family 
commitments, unequal access to informal parallel networks, which is a prerogative of 
men, etc. What is not mentioned in these reports is the male-dominated employment 
culture of the UN, which traces its origins in the Organisation’s field and negotiating 
missions, which were traditionally the exclusive battleground for men. Given, therefore, 
that many career diplomats and field veterans that currently serve in the Secretariat have 
originated from such backgrounds, it is difficult for them to work under female bosses. 
This, in turn, makes mutual working relationships difficult and certainly very stressful 
and unpleasant for women at senior levels, particularly where such problems are endemic 
and are not properly addressed by the Organisation. Even so, the vast majority of senior 
posts which are attractive for female candidates are not within field operations. If these 
reasons explain the lack of adequate gender representation at the senior grades level, then 
why is it that the measures adopted since the mid-1990s to address gender disparity have 
actually paid off between the levels of P-1 to P-4?
61
 It seems to this author that none of 
the relevant reports attempts to touch, let alone address this issue, but the reason for such 
abstinence is crystal clear. Neither the UN Charter, nor the UN’s Staff Regulations 
elaborate on the modalities and appointment procedures with regard to senior level posts. 
Article 101(1) of the UN Charter merely states that the Secretary-General is authorized to 
recruit, under regulations established by the Assembly, all Secretariat Staff. This 
provision makes no distinction between senior and junior level postings. One would have 
thought that this general Charter injunction would have received ample consideration and 
elaboration in the Organization’s Regulations, but this is hardly the case. In fact, the 
office of the Secretary-General seems to have assumed this function as to appointments 
as an authority rather than a process to which his Office is involved by reiterating the 
wording of Article 101(1) of the Charter in the Staff Regulations.
62
 Yet, while special 
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procedures govern the appointment and promotion at junior staff levels, the Secretary-
General has assumed upon his Office unilateral authority to appoint persons at the senior 
levels. Nothing else is mentioned in the Staff Regulations on the procedures for senior 
appointments, save for Regulation 4.5, from which it cannot be discerned with any degree 
of accuracy whether the appointment to Under and Assistant Secretary-General falls 
within the exclusive competence of the Secretary-General. In practice, however, the 
Secretariat has interpreted Regulation 4.4 in this manner and has not established any 
procedures for appointments to senior positions. 
 
This seemingly arbitrary assumption of authority may be explained on practical grounds 
– and in fact may be justified as such - but given the Secretariat’s persistent concerns 
with gender disparity in the Organization’s higher echelons, its failure to address its own 
appointments process is at best highly conspicuous and unhealthy. A few practical 
matters should at this juncture be brought to light. Firstly, the appointment to a senior 
post in the UN system, even without a salary, is a significant and enviable achievement, 
because the appointee will have a chance to create informal networks that will assist him 
or her in future paid employment (or ad hoc consultancies) in the UN or other 
international organization, as well as enhance that person’s professional profile more 
generally. These posts are understandably extremely competitive and it is not far-fetched 
to argue that many a qualified candidate would even pay for posts of this nature, since 
they can open other doors in the future. It is for this reason that the General Assembly has 
expressed its disappointment on a number of occasions, particularly with respect to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), on account of exceptions made 
by the Secretariat in permitting the appointment of seconded personnel, in cases where 
this was strictly prohibited.
63
 Secondly, senior appointments are by their very nature 
political appointments. Candidates for these positions are senior government officials, 
including members of cabinets and parliament, senior judges, academics and others that 
are closely aligned with the governments that submit their candidacy to the Organization. 
Unlike other posts, candidates for the senior posts do not personally apply, but are 
proposed by their governments, which most often must give hard diplomatic struggles in 
order to secure their appointment. A candidacy of this nature typically commences by 
convincing the relevant government to give its unequivocal backing, then followed by 
diplomatic efforts and political bargaining within and outside the UN, depending on the 
post. Subsequently the candidate will go through a series of formal and informal 
interviews with concerned governments, particularly for judicial and similar 
appointments, and if the candidate manages to satisfy the political requirements of said 
entities, he or she will then possess sufficient backing within the UN itself, in which case 
the Secretary-General will only serve to ratify that person’s appointment. In respect of 
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particular senior posts, such a long process might be unnecessary where the situation is 
urgent and lists of candidates have already been sieved through the UN’s political filter in 
anticipation of such postings. A typical example is the appointment of special envoys or 
fact-finding experts.
64
 As a result of these observations it is obvious that a powerful, 
behind-the-scenes, interplay of politics and personal relations is in existence, in which 
neither the Secretariat nor the candidate’s government agents have the exclusive upper 
hand. One of the key problems underlying the systemic failings of employment relations 
in the United Nations has to do with the fact that its internal justice system is “outmoded, 
dysfunctional, ineffective and lacks independence”. In fact, no separation of powers has 
been found to exist and the Secretary-General has until now been acting as legislator, 
judge and enforcer of employment relations. This was the conclusion reached by an 
independent Redesign Panel on the UN System of Administration of Justice. The Panel 
proposed the streamlining of procedures with a view to effective dispute resolution 
mechanisms, staffed by independent and professional persons, more decentralized to 
encompass field staff. Moreover, it was proposed that the Joint Appeals Boards and the 
Joint Disciplinary Committees be replaced with a new decentralized Dispute Tribunal 
composed of independent judges with power to issue binding decisions. As a result, 
UNAT would become an appellate court for UN internal justice matters.
65
 The findings 
and recommendations of the Report were ultimately endorsed by the General Assembly 
and a rehauling of the UN’s internal justice system was mandated with a view to its 
restructuring by early 2009.
66
 It is anticipated that these new mechanisms will contribute 
significantly to speedier and more effective gender-related disparity disputes, but they 
will do nothing for senior female applicants aspiring to join the Organisation. 
 
As things stand, the Secretary-General’s discretionary authority is not unlimited and the 
matter has at various times given strong concerns to the Assembly. In particular, the 
Assembly has been caustic about the Secretariat’s practice of failing to publicly announce 
all its senior vacancies, thus undermining the UN Charter’s equal opportunities 
provisions.
67
 More importantly, the Assembly made it clear that the “discretionary power 
of the Secretary-General of appointment and promotion outside the established 
procedures should be limited to his executive office and the Under Secretary-General and 
Assistant Secretary-General levels, as well as special envoys at all levels”.68 Even so, the 
Secretary-General’s administrative and managerial discretionary powers “should be in 
conformity with the relevant provisions of the UN Charter and the staff, financial and 
program planning regulations and mandates given by the General Assembly”.69 The 
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arbitrary exercise of this discretionary authority has to some degree been documented 
within the UN by other bodies, other than the Assembly. In a 2000 Report issued by the 
UN’s Joint Investigations Unit, it transpired that the Secretariat was not true to its 
mandate for wide geographical representation, nor, indeed, its duty towards greater 
numbers of female appointments to senior posts.
70
 The Report, moreover, revealed that 
the performance appraisal system (PAS) that was put in place to evaluate the 
performance of staff members up to, and including, the Under Secretary-General level 
had been selectively applied to senior staff, and a good number had even gone un-
appraised.
71
 In return, the Secretary-General, in order to alleviate the Assembly’s 
concerns as to the arbitrary employment of his discretionary powers in respect of senior 
appointments has tried to convey the impression that he is in fact assisted and consulted 
by an informal group of independent advisors, as and when required.
72
 The expected 
outcome of these procedures include a search for the widest possible spectrum of views 
on the best available candidates, as well as a desire to benefit from consultations with UN 
member States on these appointments.
73
 Despite the failings of the system at all levels 
and the Secretariat’s dismal performance in remedying its gender imbalances, the 
Secretary-General in one of his last reports, although making some otherwise acute 
observations, simply reiterated gender and geographical disparity at the senior level of 
appointments without mentioning, let alone criticize, his discretionary authority and the 
need for a transparent mechanism. This seems to be a taboo issue in the United Nations 
Secretariat, but one that certainly serves its various protagonists very well. 
 
One should not hurriedly reach the conclusion that the absence of women from senior 
positions is attributable solely to institutional deficiencies. The UN is unable to provide 
child-care facilities for mothers in the field and child benefit grants are generally 
available when the child reaches a compulsory school age. In other fields, the 
Organisation has improved its gender mainstreaming practice by providing the 
opportunity of flexible working arrangements,
74
 working away from the office,
75
 part-
time work,
76
 family leave
77
 and maternity leave.
78
 The functions and exigencies of the 
UN in many field operations is certainly a disincentive for many prospective female 
candidates, particularly those with dependent children. It may very well be the case that 
in such circumstances even the UN’s best intentions in respect of gender mainstreaming 
will yield no results. However, the very fact that only few women serve, or are willing to 
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serve, in such operations does not mean that the Organisation should not strive to make 
additional efforts to accommodate them. The ambit of the UN’s gender policies is not 
confined to the Secretariat or similar missions, but are applicable to the remotest field 
mission. One must, however, adopt a realistic stance as regards the modalities of field 
operations and should not expect the UN to maintain a child-care facility for one or two 
children or provide for flexible working hours in the midst of a battle zone. 
 
Having examined the institutional law and policy of the United Nations in respect of 
appointments and promotions, we have managed to discern only a general discrepancy in 
respect of gender. This discrepancy, however, tells us nothing about the relationship 
between gender and geographical distribution, which is central to this discussion because 
it is principally women from developing States that are most precluded from appointment 
to senior posts. As a result, gender mainstreaming within the Organisation would achieve 
little if it was not moreover directed to address the element of geography. 
 
 
The Link between Geographical and Gender Disparity and Why it Matters 
 
Candidates from so-called under-represented countries, particularly from Africa, large 
parts of Asia, South America and Eastern Europe, are significantly disadvantaged as 
regards employment opportunities in the UN, at both the senior and lower levels. This 
lack of geographical representation, which should otherwise be central to the 
Organization’s recruitment policy, is attributed among others to a lack of sufficient 
outreach, lack of clear managerial focus at junior-level recruitment, short deadlines,
79
 
lack of transparency and many others.
80
 The keen observer will not fail to notice that 
these are causes that are attributable to managerial processes and the need for their 
improvement, but they do not reflect on the role played by interpersonal relations. For 
one thing, the United Nations suffers from the same inherent institutional maladies as do 
all organizations, whether public or private. Physical persons are the soul of 
organizational structures, tending naturally to form intra-alliances and informal networks 
at both the personal, the governmental and the inter-governmental level. While these 
personal relationships are not necessarily malignant, the Secretariat is in large part unable 
to comprehensively address these systemic inefficiencies, partly because of the large 
spread of the UN and its constant staffing needs, resulting in greater delegation and thus 
lack of better and central oversight, and partly because the Secretariat is itself part of the 
problem on account of the customary political character of senior appointments, 
including of course the Secretariat’s staff and the Secretary-General himself. The 
Assembly has on occasion, sometimes subtly, others bluntly, reminded the Secretariat 
that no senior post within the UN system should be viewed as “belonging” to any 
particular State, and that accordingly no succession of nationals of the same State should 
                                                 
79
 Nonetheless, the Secretariat in a recent proposal requested from the Assembly that it reduce the time 
required for advertising a vacancy from 60 to 45 days. See UN Doc A/59/253 (2005). 
80
 See S-G Report, Measures to Address the Imbalance in the Geographical Distribution of the Staff in the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc A/61/823 (28 March 2007); S-G Report, 
Investing in People, UN Doc A/61/255 (9 Aug 2006), para 47. 
be allowed as of right.
81
 What all this points to is an institutional culture that has deep 
roots in the Organization, where although gender is addressed through adequate 
procedures at the lower professional levels, despite this festering culture, it is certainly 
not addressed at the senior levels because of the lack of any transparent mechanism. 
 
We shall see in the next section that although a number of women, albeit few, have been 
appointed to senior positions, these were in their majority either from developed nations 
or had received the strong governmental backing of a developing State. This author is 
hardly criticizing these appointments, but whereas women from developed countries have 
far greater access to mid-level and senior posts, as opposed to their developing country 
counterparts, the relevant statistics will eventually show that gender disparity is eroding, 
albeit marginally, and fail to associate this increase with the failure of geographical 
distribution.
82
 Were the two factors to be assessed in tandem, they would clearly 
demonstrate that women in the developed world have little access to the United Nations 
on account of their socio-economic conditions therein and are unlikely to apply in the 
same numbers for junior to mid-level posts as are women from the developed world.
83
 In 
a further twist to enhance statistical findings, the Secretariat has construed the principle 
of geographic representation as referring to regions or groups, rather than countries. In 
this manner, the lack of female appointments from under-represented countries may be 
statistically alleviated if women from other countries are grouped together. The Assembly 
has deplored this practice.
84
 The UN’s Office of Human Resources (OHR), should 
therefore focus not only generally on under-represented developing States, but make 
special provision for women therein, as a special category.  
 
If the UN’s aspirations towards gender and geographical parity, as well as its desire to 
recruit personnel of the highest caliber, are not merely of a hortatory nature, the 
Organization must adopt and enforce exceptional, yet transparent processes. Given our 
previous statement on the political background of nominations for senior posts, a grave 
imbalance may be discerned between female (and male to some degree) candidates from 
developed and developing countries. Most developing countries lack general democratic 
governance and democratic mechanisms, even where they purport to practice 
constitutionalism and profess to free and open elections. Moreover, in the vast majority 
of these countries the representation of women in the higher echelons of government, the 
judiciary and academia will be significantly low and in any event dominated by clan, 
tribal and privileged considerations. Indeed, to make matters worse, in some countries 
there will be legislation in place that excludes women from the higher echelons of 
government and the judiciary altogether,
85
 whereas in others there will be calls by male 
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figures to ban women from being appointed to such positions.
86
 Given that it is these 
same governments that will advocate in favor of their chosen candidates in respect of 
senior UN posts, by accepting these candidates simply under the pretense of satisfying 
geographical representation, the Organization is responsible for a grave injustice against 
the true under-represented people. Women from the developing world are, therefore, 
doubly disadvantaged. Such secrecy and lack of transparency in respect of judicial 
appointments is not, however, an attribute of only developing countries, it must be said,
87
 
and CEDAW at one point even criticized Sweden with regard to the low level of 
representation of women in the higher echelons of its foreign office, particularly 
ambassadorial posts, as well as its overall low representation in the judiciary.
88
 It is 
crucial, as a result, for the Secretariat to radically revise its appointments strategy by 
premising geographical representation on the basis of a transparent and competitive 
process, not on political nominations. The United Kingdom, recently advertised and held 
an open competition for the candidature of a judicial post in respect of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).
89
 The competition was hosted by the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) and the Lord Chancellor, from the outcome of which the incumbent judge, 
Justice Fulford, was ultimately nominated.
90
 However, this was purely an ad hoc 
arrangement and does not constitute official policy. This author fully understands the 
political ramifications of such a policy in the context of the United Nations and the 
vociferous reactions of developing States, but it seems the only realistic solution for 
effectively overturning both gender disparity and geographical under-representation.
91
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 Having examined the representation of women in the senior levels of the UN’s 
administrative hierarchy, it is appropriate to assess their inclusion in the UN’s judicial 
institutions. Much like appointments to other senior positions, judicial appointments are 
in a category of their own that require multiple layers of political bargaining between 
contesting States and where the person of the judge is a factor taken very seriously by the 
appointees because of his or her independent status. 
 
 
 
The Law and Politics of International Judicial Appointments 
 
For most legal academics, particularly international lawyers, an appointment to an 
international judicial or quasi-judicial post constitutes a very significant personal 
achievement. Gender apathy has played a large part in leaving women largely outside 
these judicial institutions, particularly during the Cold War years. Appointment to such 
positions within the UN system is still subject to the relevant provisions of the UN 
Charter and the UN’s Staff Regulations, despite the obvious requirement of independence 
and the non-permanent character of these jobs. An exhaustive analysis of the employment 
situation in all UN tribunals is outside the scope of this article, but the practice of the 
most prominent ones will be duly discussed and some brief comparisons with tribunals 
outside the UN system will be made. 
 
Two ingredients would truly facilitate the admission of women to international 
judgeships; a) fair, open, independent and competitive nominations at the national level, 
and; b) gender parity considerations at the final selection process and through the relevant 
rules of the judicial institution. Although the trend seems to be changing, some of the 
older institutions, such as the ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee, do not require any 
gender quotas or equivalent considerations in the composition of the Committee, nor any 
obligations at the domestic level to conduct an open competition in order for member 
States to select their nominees. The only requirement is that consideration be given to 
equitable geographical distribution and representation of the different forms of 
civilization and of the principal legal systems.
92
 As to the judges’ personal traits, they 
must be persons of high moral character and of recognized competence in the field of 
human rights.
93
 Other than that, the parties are free to nominate whomever they wish and 
to subsequently agree collectively on the successful appointees. The same is true with 
respect to the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS),
94
 
Article 2 of which caters only for equitable geographical considerations. The Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) constitutes a minor improvement to the 
aforementioned, despite the fact that it does not incorporate a gender-related provision. 
Article 4(1) of the Statute provides that national nominees shall come from a list drafted 
by each national group in the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Each national group is 
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recommended to consult its highest courts, law schools and other scholars in order to 
compile its list of nominees, according to Article 6 of the Statute. Unlike the Human 
Rights Committee and ITLOS, judicial appointments in the ICJ need not reflect an 
equitable geographical distribution, but only represent the main forms of civilization and 
the principal legal systems of the world.
95
 The lack of gender considerations in the 
appointments of judges is also evident in the case of the UN’s ad hoc tribunals for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and that of Rwanda (ICTR), albeit Articles 12 ter and 13 ter of the 
ICTY and ICTR Statutes respectively provide that with respect to ad litem judge 
nominations, account should be taken of the importance of fair representation of female 
and male candidates.
96
 Neither does the Statute of the International Law Commission 
(ILC) protect and support the presence of females, but like its other counterparts it does 
provide for the representation of regional groupings and of the main forms of 
civilization.
97
  
 
The list can go on, but certain conclusions are unmistakable. Representation based on 
geographical and principal legal system considerations has substituted, and in fact 
overruled, the need for gender considerations.
98
 The end of the Cold War has not 
remedied this situation. Moreover, politics outweigh the need for an open national 
competition and it is also true that the final selection is equally political, as it is member 
States or the political organs of the United Nations that ultimately decide on the relevant 
judicial appointments. The argument that the rules are of considerable vintage and drafted 
in a bygone era, but which nonetheless raise insurmountable problems to revise is a 
tenable argument. Nonetheless, if despite the letter of the rules the Secretariat and 
member States were willing to import gender considerations in the appointments 
procedure of said judicial and quasi-judicial institutions, this would have been reflected 
in practice and in the numbers of female judges. The empirical evidence suggests 
otherwise. Since the inception of the ICJ, more than sixty years ago, there has only been 
one female judge on its bench. Equally, during the same time in the ILC, only two female 
commissioners have been appointed, and then only recently. While the situation in the 
ICTY and ICTR is certainly an improvement, the overall ratio between men and women 
on the bench remains very low. As far as the Secretariat’s position on this gaping gender 
disparity is concerned and its subsequent absolute failure to meet its 50/50 targets, four 
possible inferences may be made: a) the first is that it is politically out-muscled by the 
interests of State parties; b) secondly, that national nominations encompassing women are 
low compared to that of their male colleagues, c) thirdly, the UN is content to achieve its 
targets at the junior to mid-level postings because there is less political friction involved, 
and; d) fourthly, the enforcement of an affirmative action gender-related procedure where 
this is excluded in the relevant instruments runs contrary to the wishes of the parties and 
cannot be imposed. Moreover, and closely related to the last argument, one may counter 
that the UN’s institutional employment law is inapplicable vis-à-vis these posts.  The first 
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three are certainly plausible arguments, whereas the fourth is legally flawed since all 
personnel employed in international tribunals run by the United Nations, including the 
judges, are in the service of the United Nations and are subject to the full gamut of its 
institutional law. 
 
It will be of some comfort to note that some exceptions do exist. For one thing, women 
are well represented in the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, as well as in the capacity of 
thematic Special Rapporteurs, mandated by the High Commission for Human Rights.
99
 
Chinkin et al attribute this phenomenon to the fact that women are viewed as being best 
suited to deal with “soft”, issues, as opposed to “hard” disputes, such as trade, maritime 
and others.
100
 Irrespective of this assertion, there exists no empirical evidence to suggest 
that female judges decide cases different to men, particularly that they employ an ethics 
of care or that their judgments are somehow rooted in social context rather than legal 
abstraction, etc. If anything, the contrary has been revealed on the basis of available 
research.
101
 There is equally no empirical evidence demonstrating that women judges are 
by their nature more prone to activism than their male counterparts. In a comprehensive 
study of all dissents of ECHR judges between 1955 until 2006 it was shown that a 
judge’s level of activism or conservatism is linked to the political ideology of the 
government that appointed him or her. As a result, aspiring EU member States preferred 
activist judicial appointments in order to highlight human rights commitments, as did 
governments disposed toward European integration.
102
 Clearly, therefore, gender is 
immaterial to activism or to the way that a judge may perceive the factual elements of a 
case. 
 
Returning to the few female appointments to the senior UN positions indicated above, to 
the extent that these are ad hoc and not institutional arrangements, means that they are 
subject to change in the life cycle of said judicial or thematic bodies. Thus, one need not 
necessarily be content. What is required is an imbedded institutionalised continuity, much 
in the same sense as Article 36 of the ICC Statute. Our concern in this study is on 
paragraphs 8(a)(iii) and 4(a), the latter of which requires fair representation of female and 
male judges, whereas the former obliges parties to formalise a national system for judicial 
nominations, either by employing the ICJ model, or by putting in motion the same 
procedure as that for appointment to their highest judicial posts.
103
 In a questionnaire 
drafted and distributed by Amnesty International to all ICC member States in respect of 
their first judicial nominations,
104
 only eight of the forty-five countries that nominated 
candidates responded. Amnesty’s research revealed that of the countries that did not 
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respond to its questionnaire, many did not publicly advertise the process, failed to take 
adequate measures to inform highly qualified women, which resulted in only a quarter of 
nominees being women. Moreover, civil society was fully or partially excluded from the 
nomination process, “failing to take advantage of the important role that such groups can 
play in identifying qualified candidates, contributing to the drafting of an advertisement 
and criteria for selection and commenting on applicants”. Finally, Amnesty deplored the 
fact that the names of nominees were not publicly announced, thus preventing “comment 
on the scope of persons being considered, such as the absence of persons from certain 
ethnic groups or of women, at a time when this imbalance could be rectified, and 
preventing comment on the qualifications of particular persons under consideration at a 
time when it could affect the nomination”.105 Those States that had opted for an open 
competition had either promulgated new legislation,
106
 adapted their existing legislation 
on national judicial appointments to encompass the ICC,
107
 or did so on an ad hoc basis, 
like the UK. The combination of a gender provision in the ICC Statute and a concerted 
effort on the part of committed States has led to eight women sitting on its bench. 
 
The UN Secretariat has a lot to learn from these processes at the national level. There is 
no significant difference between the ICC and the judicial institutions under the aegis of 
the United Nations. Although the UN’s procedures are by now rigid, there is no denying 
that its administrative reform process has to start within its member States and not at the 
stage when nominations are received at the door of the Organization. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have determined the discrepancy between the UN’s institutional law of employment 
and that of the domestic law of other States (which in and of itself does not create any 
normative problems), as well as the theoretical inapplicability of international human 
rights standards as treaty obligations incumbent directly on the United Nations. 
Nonetheless, the rich jurisprudence of the UN Administrative Tribunal suggests that such 
standards and norms are in practice relevant to UN employment relations and to a very 
large degree binding on the UN in its relations with its employees. Beyond human rights 
treaties, the UN has pursued since the latter part of the 1980s a seemingly vigorous 
campaign towards eradicating gender imbalances in the Secretariat. Although the 
measures adopted have paid off at the P-1 and P-2 levels (the UN’s junior professional 
levels), they have yielded no results at the more senior levels of the Organization. This 
failure can be explained on many grounds related to the institutional structures of the 
Secretariat and the nominating practice of States, as well as the general politicised 
appointments culture at the senior levels. This politicised nature of senior appointments 
does not,  however,  feature in any of the reports of the Secretariat on its employment 
relations. The content of these reports is at best superficial, full of managerial jargon, but 
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without any assessment of the deep-rooted human resources problems of the United 
Nations. Certainly, in certain circumstances the lack of female candidates may be 
attributed to the particular exigencies of field posts which are hardly attractive for women 
candidates, particularly those with dependents, and in relation to which the UN cannot be 
expected to create accommodating conditions. Nonetheless, the majority of posts for 
which female candidates from developing countries are excluded do not involve field 
missions. The problem may be traced firstly at the stage of nomination, where member 
States employ political and informal networking criteria in the absence of a formalised 
and open competition that moreover lacks the active involvement of civil society. The 
existence of formalised and open competitions, coupled with a strict gender requirement, 
would certainly culminate in the short-listing of the highest quality nominees. Thereafter, 
were a gender quota, in conjunction with a geographical distribution dimension, to be 
established by the Secretariat and religiously adhered, nominating countries would be 
forced to also shortlist female candidates for top jobs. As a result, despite any political 
shortcomings and inter-State bargaining, the eventual appointments would be ensured of 
sufficient gender distribution from both the developed and the developing world. This 
author is not advocating that female candidates should be generally promoted on feminist 
or similar grounds; rather, the promotion of female candidates from the developing world 
to senior posts within the UN’s administrative and judicial machineries helps to highlight 
and give a voice to the severely unrepresented masses of this world. The application of 
positive action by the UN through requiring a quota of female candidates at the national 
nomination stage would certainly have the effect of also enhancing women’s rights in 
countries that do not generally adhere to them as a matter of both culture and law. There 
is no better way to challenge cultural beliefs and stereotypes without being viewed as 
interfering in the domestic affairs of other States. 
 
The UN Secretariat needs to formalise this two-prong procedure and as far as its 
Regulations are concerned, even if the Secretary-General retains his exclusive authority 
to appoint persons at the most senior level, he should do so on the basis of an established 
and open procedure. Equally, every effort should be exerted at the extra-institutional level 
to convince States to adopt laws or fair procedures with respect to their nominations for 
senior international posts, including judgeships, encompassing an equal amount of men 
and women. Moreover, the UN should actively support the incorporation of relevant 
clauses in future conventions that set up international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. 
 
 
 
